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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
LIBEL AND SLANDER-PRIVILEGED COMIMUNICATIONS-CLIENT'S COMPLAINT
TO BAR ASSOCIATION.-The publication of a communication by a client charg-
ing an attorney with irregular conduct, addressed to a committee of the St.
Louis Bar Association which had the authority to examine and inquire into
alleged grievances complained of, was held qualifiedly privileged, there be-
ing no express or actual malice on the part of the client. The case was
somewhat complicated by a dispute as to the exact identity of the attorney
charged with the misconduct, and by technical issues in the field of pleading
and instructions. In addition to upholding the defense of qualified privilege,
the court found that the evidence supported the truth of the communication
in issue. Lee v. Fuetterer Battery and Supplies Company (Mo. 1929) 23
S. W. (2d) 45. The case is interesting chiefly in that it appears to be a case
of first instance, not only in the jurisdiction but in the courts of this country.
The analogy drawn by the court between the precise question and similar
situations where the issue has been adjudicated seems very apt. "Upon
principle," says the court, "we see no reasonable or logical distinction, or
difference, between a professional body such as a bar association, composed
of various individual practitioners of the legal profession, and other bodies
made up of various individuals having a common and mutual purpose and
interest, such as corporations, churches, medical societies, merchants, bank-
ers or commission brokers. If the publication of a communication to a
church, or to the stockholders and directors of a corporation, or to a medical
society, be conditionally, or qualifiedly privileged, as is seemingly held to be
the established rule by the weight of juristic authority, then, by analogy,
the rule is equally applicable to the publication of a communication ad-
dressed to a bar association, or to one of its committees having authority to
examine and inquire into the supposed grievance complained of by the com-
municant, and to redress such grievance, if any there be." This comparison
is followed by a review of the purposes and ideals of the American Bar As-
sociation, together with a setting forth of the applicable Canons of Ethics of
that organization. The extent of the authority of the particular committee
of the association here addressed and its method of procedure are set forth
at another point in the opinion.
The rules of such an association are, of course, not of the force of legisla-
tive enactment, but they do express the ideals and standards generally ac-
cepted in the profession. These ideals are more or less known to the lay
public, which expects observance of them by individual members of the pro-
fession. "Consequently," the opinion continues, "those individuals compris-
ing the lay public, and especially those of the lay public who, in the course
of business or domestic transactions, require the professional advice and
services of the lawyer, owe a duty to the body of the legal profession, and
to the bar association, which is the organized representative Of the body of
the profession, to communicate to such organized representative of the body
of the profession any grievance, wrong or injury suffered by the com-
municant, and arising from the relation of attorney and client, and bona
fide believed by the communicant to have been occasioned by any unprofes-
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sional or unethical act or conduct of the lawyer." And the court concludes
with a statement that it is the corresponding duty of the bar association, as
the organized representative Of the profession, to examine and inquire into
the subject-matter of such a communication in order that the alleged griev-
ance may be redressed or corrected.
The prevailing rule or principle has been announced to be that a publica-
tion is conditionally, or qualifiedly privileged, "whenever the author and pub-
lisher of the alleged slander acted in the bona fide discharge of a public or
private duty, legal or moral; or in the prosecution of his own rights or in-
terest." White v. Nicholls (U. S. 1845) 3 How. 266; Townhend, SLANDER
AND LIBEL (4th ed. 1890) secs. 209, 237; 32 C. J. 1241. "A publication is
therefore prima facie qualifiedly privileged where circumstances obtain with
respect to a right or duty to communicate to others what, of right, they
ought to know, even though it is not a legal, but only a moral or social duty
of imperfect obligation." State ex rel. Zorn v. Cox (1927) 318 Mo. 112, 298
S. W. 837. "Privilege rebuts the presumption of malice, and the burden of
proof is cast upon the plaintiff to prove express malice." Sullivan v. Com-
mission Co. (1899) 152 Mo. 268, 53 S. W. 912. The case at bar is, however,
a step beyond certain of the authorities relied upon, in that in the cases in-
volving communications to a medical society or a church body the com-
municant seems to have been a member of the group rather than an inde-
pendent layman. McKnight v. Hasbrouck (1890) 17 R. I. 70, 20 Atl. 95;
Farnsworth v. Storrs (Mass. 1850) 5 Cush. 412. A number of recent cases
have held that voluntary communications to proper authorities of violations
of the National Prohibition Act are qualifiedly privileged. Wasylenko v.
Frysky (1927) 130 Misc. 716, 224 N. Y. S. 329; Popke v. Hoffman (1926) 21
Ohio App. 454, 153 N. E. 248.
The decision would seem, then, to be an extension of an accepted rule into
an essentially similar, though new, field of activity. The policy of aiding
to uphold the standards of legal profession is undoubtedly sound. If the
publication of such communications is not qualifiedly privileged the useful-
ness of organizations of professional men and women is limited to a mere
exchange of ideas or social intercourse, or the correction of misconduct oc-
curring directly within the sphere of the association's cognizance.
C. V. E., '31.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS--REGULATIONS OF STREETS-PROHIBITIONS or
PARKING.-The recent ordinance prohibiting parking of automobiles in the
downtown district of Chicago during business hours, in the opinion of the
Supreme Court of Illinois was an unreasonable exercise of the power of the
municipality to regulate traffic. The arrest and fine of a local attorney who
left his car outside his downtown office while engaged in a thirty-minute
conference with a client brought the validity of the enactment before the
court. The decision invalidated legislation which was the result of a survey
of traffic congestion conditions which had cost the city over $50,000. Hag-
genjos v. City of Chicago (1929) 336 Ill. 573, 168 N. E. 661.
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